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Content Pluralism​1 
 
Introduction 
 
How fine-grained are the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes? Are the 
contents of our beliefs individuated solely in terms of the objects, properties, and 
relations that figure in their truth conditions, or rather in terms of our concepts, or 
modes of presentation of those objects, properties, and relations? So-called Millians 
famously maintain the former whereas their Fregean rivals hold the latter. Much of the 
20th century literature on the nature of propositional content can be seen as a debate 
between the Millians and Fregeans on this question of grain.​2​ But despite the vast 
amount of ink spilled on the metaphysics of propositions, including the important 
recent work of act-type theorists such as Hanks and Soames, the problem of grain 
remains with us.​3  
1
 We would like to thank the audience at the Workshop on Act-Type propositions at the University of the 
Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Donostia-San Sebastian, as well as Gary Ostertag for discussion of this 
material. A very special thanks is due to Peter Hanks. Much of our thinking on these matters is directly 
responsive to his written work  as well as  discussions with him on related issues. From the earliest 
presentations we can remember seeing Peter give on his view, he emphasized the underlying 
propositions-as-devices-of categorization thesis  fueling his work  Moreover, even in those early 
presentations, he also openly embraced a pluralism of content that seems to naturally follow (see the 
discussion of  “The Uniqueness Thesis’ in Hanks (manuscript). In what follows, it  should be clear how 
indebted we are to Peter. 
2
 Although conceiving of propositions in terms of sets of possible worlds remains important in formal 
semantics, the philosophical dispute has primarily been between two parties, Millians and Fregeans. See 
Schiffer (2008) for further discussion. In what follows, we will mostly set aside the possible worlds view of 
propositions.  
3
 See Hanks (2015), as well as Soames (2015), for how we might try to accommodate at least some of our 
Fregean inutions on the act-type theory. 
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In what follows, however, we will argue that there is an important insight 
forthcoming from the newer work on the metaphysics of propositions that helps us see 
the traditional debate between Millians and Fregeans in a new light. Roughly put, the 
insight, especially emphasized in Hanks (2015), is that propositions are fundamentally 
devices of categorisation. In particular, they serve to characterise our thoughts and 
utterances in terms of their representational features, features that can, and must, be 
understood independently of the propositions we use to track them. As we will see, this 
categorisation insight allows one to sidestep the forced choice presented by Millians and 
Freageans. Simply put, the states that realize our propositional attitudes have ​many 
contents that themselves differ in representational grain. Our proposed resolution to (or 
dissolution of) the question of grain won’t be completely satisfying to either the Millian 
or the Fregean. We hope, however, that the pluralist conception of propositional content 
that we will sketch will be appealing to those theorists, such as us, who feel the pull of 
aspects of both of the Millian and the Fregean accounts.​4 
The game plan is as follows. In the first half of the paper, we revisit some of the 
motivations and problems for the traditional Fregean and Millian theories of 
propositional content. As we will see, though neither of these accounts is correct, they 
both offer important, and conflicting, insights regarding the problem of grain. In effect, 
our judgements regarding representational sameness and difference are equivocal; 
Millian intuitions regarding grain motivate one metric of representational sameness, 
Fregean intuitions another. In the second half, we then turn to the more recent work on 
propositions focusing on the act-type view due to Hanks (2015) and Soames (2010) , as 
well as the minimalist view we favor,​5​ focusing on the categorization insight that 
underwrites both. We then show that the categorization conception of propositions, 
naturally leads to content pluralism. We conclude with a brief discussion of the shape of 
this pluralism would take on the act-type view, as well as on Minimalism.  
 
Section One - The Millian and the Fregean  
4
 There are a number of important precedents for our favored response to the problem of grain including 
the pluralistist accounts of content favored by Chalmers (2006) and Perry (2001), as well as Moore 
(1999).  Like Moore, we think that pluralism flows naturally from the correct metaphysical story of 
propositions.  
5
 See Grzankowski and Buchanan (2019) and Buchanan and Grzankowski (forthcoming). 
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Both the Millian and Fregean hold​ ​the orthodox view that (i) propositional attitude 
verbs such as ‘believes’ express binary relations between agents and the semantic value 
of a ‘that’-clauses: a belief report of the form ‘S believes that p’ being true if, and only if, 
the agent in question stands in the belief relation to the semantic  value of ‘that p’, and 
(ii) that the semantic value of a ‘that’-clause is a proposition. What distinguishes these 
theorists are their differing accounts of the nature of the propositions that ‘that’-clauses 
designate.​6 
According to the Millian (a) the propositions we believe and assert are ​Russellian 
propositions – structured complexes composed of objects, properties, and relations and 
(b) the propositional contribution of a referring expression is merely its referent; the 
propositional contribution of a predicate is the property it expresses.​7​ By contrast, the 
Fregean holds that propositions are structured entities built out of an agent’s concepts 
or modes of presentation (“MOPs”) that figure in their truth-conditions. The dispute 
between the Millian and Fregean is a familiar one, so we will be brief in our treatment of 
the views. Our primary goal in this section is to remind the reader of the various ways in 
which each view seems to get something right.  
Start with the Millian. Suppose a competent speaker literally and sincerely utters 
(1) while demonstrating the country singer, Garth Brooks: 
 
(1) That guy is American. 
 
Millian theorists hold that the propositional contribution of a referring expression 
such as the complex demonstrative ‘that guy’​8​ simply ​is ​nothing over and above its 
referent. The semantic contribution of a predicate is simply the property or relation it 
expresses. Hence, one might represent the proposition expressed by the speaker’s 
utterance of (1) as as the following:  
 
<α, φ>  
 
6
 We have our general doubts about the orthodox account. See for example Bach (1996) and Buchanan 
(2012, 2016). We will leave this aside for present purposes.  
7
 Notice that one could endorse the Russlian conception propositions without being a Millian. One could, 
for example, be a descriptivist and hold that the contribution of a referring expression (say, ‘Aristotle’) is a 
uniqueness property (e.g, the property of being the one and only greatest philosopher of antiquity) .  
8
 We are assuming that the complex demonstrative ‘that guy’ in (1)  is a genuine referring expression (for 
some dissent see King 2001).  
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where α is Garth, φ is the property of being American. The ordered pair being true at 
a world w if, and only if, α instantiates φ at w, and is false otherwise. But notice that 
this will be the same proposition expressed by any utterance of a sentence that differs 
from (1) only in the substitution of some co-referring expression with ‘that guy’. So, 
for example, the Millian will hold that (1) expresses the same proposition as (2): 
 
(2) Garth Brooks is American. 
 
Not only is this prediction well motivated by the familiar arguments from Kripke (1980), 
Marcus (1961), and others for taking referring expressions to be rigid designators, it is 
also intuitive. Isn’t it clear that these two utterances at least in some important sense 
represent the world as being exactly the same way? After all, a thinker who judges (1) 
and (2) to be true is predicating the same property of the same object.​9 
If we further assume that the singular Russellian proposition expressed by (1)/(2) 
is the semantic-value of the ‘that’-clause in (3), and that ‘believes’ expresses a two-place 
relation between believers and things believed, then we might represent the belief report 
in (3) as (3a): 
 
(3) Gwen believes that Garth Brooks is American.  
(3a) Believes <Gwen, <α, φ>>  
 
For the Millian, ​what ​Gwen is claimed to believe in (3) is itself the singular proposition 
<α, φ>. And in some sense, this seems to be exactly the right prediction. After all, when 
we consider Gwen’s belief reported in (3), isn’t it plausible that it represents things as 
being just as the speaker uttering (1) said them to be? Moreover, isn't there some clear 
sense in which we would be reporting exactly the same belief of Gwen’s if we’d instead 
said, ‘She believes that guy [demonstrating Garth] is American’?. Millian contents might 
seem to be of just the right fineness of grain. 
9
 The last step in this argument may be seen as implicitly based on a principle about the identity of 
propositions. An elementary version of this principle, involving simple propositions that predicate a 
property or relation of one or more objects, is given by (pi). 
 
(pi) If p and q are simple propositions in which precisely the same properties are predicated 
of precisely the same things, then p = q. 
 
The idea behind (pi) is that all there is to propositions is the way they represent things as being. Since the 
propositions semantically expressed by (1) and (2) both represent the same man as having the same 
property, and don't differ in the way in which they represent anything else as being, the proposition 
semantically expressed by (1) and the proposition semantically expressed by (2) are one and the same. 
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By contrast, the Fregean account of propositional content is best understood as 
a direct response to the perceived problems with the Millian view. To illustrate their 
worries, recall one of the more interesting episodes in the modern history of country 
music involving Garth Brooks. The then most popular country singer, Garth Brooks, 
released an album of very bad pop music under the alias ‘Chris Gaines’ and toured the 
country in disguise to promote the record.
 
This was a time of considerable confusion. While we were confused why the famous 
country star would dress in disguise and play such atrocious pop music, Gwen’s 
confusion was different. She did not, as we might want to put it, realize that Chris 
Gaines is Garth Brooks. Though she would have happily accepted the sentence ‘Chris 
Gaines is Canadian’ as true, she ardently denied that ‘Garth Brooks is Canadian’ is 
true. The belief report given in (4) was intuitively true of her, though (5) seemingly 
false despite the fact that Chris Gaines is identical to Garth Brooks: 
 
(4) Gwen believes that Chris Gaines is Canadian.  
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(5) Gwen believes that Garth Brooks is Canadian. 
 
In fairness to Gwen, her beliefs were perfectly reasonable – Garth did somehow look like 
a pop star of the era in his disguise as Chris Gaines, and it is common knowledge (at 
least in the Southern States of the US) that Garth is American (in the United States 
sense of ‘American’). 
The appearance of opacity is worrisome for the proponent of Millians for at least 
two types of reasons. The first worry is a semantic one, call it the Semantic Problem. 
Their theory does not appear compatible with the possibility that (4) and (5) could 
literally diverge in truth-value, and this prediction is at odds with many  speakers’ 
intuitions regarding such cases. According to the Millian, ‘Chris Gaines is Canadian’ and 
‘Garth Brooks is Canadian’ express the same singular proposition: <α, φ>, and hence 
the two ‘that’- clauses in (4) and (5) refer to the same proposition. Hence, given the 
orthodox view, (4) and (5) express the same proposition, which we might represent: 
 
(4/5a) Believes(<Gwen, <α, φ>>) 
 
According to the Millian, (4) and (5) must have the same truth conditions, but this is, for 
many, highly counter-intuitive.  
The second type of worry for the Millian deriving from the our case of Garth 
Brooks concerns the ​rationality ​of agents to whom we are ascribing propositional 
attitudes.​10​ To illustrate, let’s more fully describe the case concerning Gwen. Not only 
would she have taken the sentence ‘Garth Brooks is Canadian’ to be false, she would 
insist that both ‘Garth Brooks is not Canadian’. Hence, we have good evidence that not 
only is (5) (seemingly) false, but that (6) is true, as well: 
 
10
 In our view, the biggest worry for the Millian account concerns the rationality of belief reporters who 
sincerely and competently  assert propositions that are, according to the Millian, contradictory. Note that 
the same evidence that would incline us to assert (6) as true (her accepting ‘Garth Brooks is not 
Canadian’) would also be likely incline us to assert (i), which on first pass, would be represented by the 
Millian as (ia): 
 
(i) Gwen does not believe that Garth is Canadian. 
(ia) ~Believes(<Gwen, <α, φ>>) 
 
(ia) looks to be the contradiction of the Millian representation of (6) – ​i.e.​ (6a). But this is as puzzling, if 
not more so, than the situation regarding (5) and (6). However implausible it is to claim that Gwen is 
irrational given (5) and (6), it is even less plausible to think that a well-intentioned, well-informed speaker 
inclined asserting (6) and (i) is irrational. How can the Millian explain how a speaker sincerely uttering 
(6) and (i) is not irrational, given that on her account the semantic contents of those reports? Let’s dub 
this worry The Speaker Rationality Problem. See Braun and Saul (2002) and Braun and Sider (2006) for 
attempts to address this worry for the Millian. 
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(6) Gwen believes that Garth Brooks is not Canadian. 
 
According to the most obvious way of implementing the Millian account, an utterance of 
(6) would express a proposition that we might represent as (6a): 
 
(6a) Believes(<Gwen, <<α, φ>, NEG>>) 
 
If Millianism is correct, then (5) and (6) are both true, and Gwen believes both a 
proposition and its negation. The truth of (5) and (6), however, in no way seems to 
impugn Gwen’s rationality. Though Gwen is no doubt confused, she is not irrational. 
How, according to the proponent of Millianism can this be? That is, how can an agent 
rationally believe contradictory propositions? Call this worry the Rationality Problem. 
Millians are sensitive to these worries and have offered well known replies. For 
example, one approach to the Semantic Problem appeals to pragmatics. According to 
such a reply, although literal utterance of, for example, (5) and (6) in fact do not diverge 
in truth value, speakers who utter them might be understood as pragmatically conveying 
propositions that do so differ (perhaps, for e.g., that Gwen would accept ‘Garth is 
Canadian’ (False) and she would accept that ‘Chris Gaines is Canadian’ (True)).​11  
In reply to the Rationality Problem, Millians have appealed to the metaphysics of 
mental states that underlie the truth of the utterances we make concerning them. 
Although ​what​ ​one believes​ is a Millian proposition faithfully reported in a belief 
attribution, there is also a question concerning ​how​ that information is encoded by, say, 
a belief. There are various ways one might see this idea through, but to offer just one 
illustration, one might appeal to distinct representational vehicles that are no part of 
content but which are important when determining the rationality of an agent.  To 
reiterate, the basic thought is that we must distinguish ​what the agent believes​ from 
further facts regarding ​how she believes it,​ or internally represents it; further facts that 
are claimed t0 not themselves reflected in the semantics of reports such as (5) and (6) 
above, but rather in the story of the underlying states that realize our propositional 
attitudes. It is then claimed that Gwen can rationally believe both a Millian proposition 
and its negation, so long as she does so under suitably different internal guises.​12 
11
 See Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002) for two sketches of how such a pragmatic story might go.  
12
 See Salmon (1986) and Braun (1998) for more details.  
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Fregeans are famously unimpressed with the Millian’s attempts to explain away 
our anti-substivity intuitions pragmatically. And while the Fregean will applaud the 
appeal to internal representations, guises, or the like, in the metaphysics of our 
propositional attitudes, they will insist that the Millian has misplaced this insight. For 
the Fregean, examples such (5) and (6) above genuinely differ in truth-value as a direct 
result of differences in ​what​ Gwen believes (not about how she believes it). After all, 
they will say,  isn’t part of the data to be explained is that  that (5) and (6) seem to report 
Gwen as believing different ​things​; ​i.e.​ different propositions.  
Let us say that any account according to which the contents of belief are mode- 
of-presentation-involving is a ​Fregean account of belief​. Fregean accounts come in 
many varieties, but for ease of exposition, it is best  to begin with a version of the view 
inspired by Recanati (1993).​13​ According to Recanati, propositions are structured 
entities whose components are modes of presentation pertaining to how an agent 
“grasps” the relevant objects and properties her belief concerns. The contents of belief, 
on this view, are conglomerates of objects, properties, relations, ​and ​modes of 
presentation thereof. The content of Gwen’s belief reported in (4) might be represented 
as the ​quasi-singular proposition ​in (4a): 
 
(4) Gwen believes that Chris Gaines is Canadian. 
(4b) << Chris/Garth, ​
M​Chris>, <the property of being Candian, ​M​Canadian>> 
 
where ​
M​Chris and ​M​Canadian are ways Gwen has of thinking of Chris/Garth and the 
property of being Canadian, respectively. Crucially, returning to the Speaker Rationality 
Problem, Gwen might rationally believe this MOP-involving proposition, while 
disbelieving, or withholding belief, from the quasi-singular proposition we might 
represent as (4c): 
 
(4c) << Chris/Garth, ​
M​Garth >, <the property of being Candian, ​M​Canadian>> 
 
In the case as described, we might say that Gwen fails to recognize that ​
M​Garth and 
M​Chris are modes of presentation of one and the same guy. More generally, Fregeans 
seek to offer an account that allows for more fineness of grain than the Millian, and in 
some sense, this seems to be  just what is  needed to account for our intuitions.  
 
13
 Recanati’s favored Fregean account (including his ‘quasi-singular propositions’) was originally due to 
Schiffer (1978). 
8 
 
Both the Millian and the Fregean have their problems. It is, for example, difficult 
to see how Fregean propositions could be suitable candidates for the contents of speech 
acts.​14​ Likewise, it is safe to say that there is not, at present, any fully satisfying 
pragmatic story that Millians have been able to offer that plausibly explains away our 
intuitions of opacity. But, for present purposes, we’d like to emphasize a different aspect 
of this familiar debate: both the Millian and the Fregean seem to be getting something 
right. Indeed, it is very hard for us  to see how we might do without ​some ​notion of 
content according to which (1) and (2) represent the world as being the same way. But 
when we turn to the individuation of mental states, something finer grained looks to be 
all but unavoidable (even the Millian who follows Salmon and appeals to guises in her 
theory of belief states feels the pull). For the Fregean, examples such (5) and (6) above 
genuinely differ in truth value as a direct result of differences in ​what​ Gwen believes 
(not about how she believes it). After all, as noted above, Gwen seemingly believes 
different things. Backing up, consider Gwen’s (token)  belief states reported in (5) and 
(6). Do those token states represent the same or not? In a sense they do, and in a sense 
they do not. The former reflects our Russellian intuitions, the latter our Fregean 
intuitions.  We would be hard pressed if  forced to choose between these intuitions.  
But why, exactly, ​should ​we have to choose? It would be preferable if our 
metaphysics of propositions didn’t leave us in this bind. In fact, we think that a theory of 
propositions that purports to decisively settle this question of grain would be 
problematic in much the way that a theory of baldness would be were it to issue precise 
verdicts in ​all​ cases. Here, as elsewhere, our theory should be just as flexible as the data 
demands. 
 
Section Two – Propositions as Devices of Categorization  
Millian and Fregean views have recently come under attack from a different direction. 
According to both of these accounts, propositions are abstract, structured entities that 
intrinsically represent​. Moreover, these structured entities are claimed to be 
fundamental in the account of how our mental states and utterances that have them as 
contents, represent things as being. On these traditional accounts, for example, it is 
claimed that Gwen’s belief that Chris Gaines is Canadian represents as it does​ in virtue 
of its propositional content​, be it Fregean or Millian. We, along with Hanks (2015), King 
(2007), Soames (2010, 2015), and other recent theorists reject this picture wholesale.​15  
14
 See Buchanan (2010) and (2016).  
15
 For further discussion and debate. King, J., Soames S., and Speaks, J. (2014). 
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One of the central worries motivating Hanks, and others, is that it is puzzling 
how propositions could represent all on their own. This mystery is only compounded if 
we take propositions to literally be n-tuples built out of ordinary objects and properties, 
or modes of presentation thereof. How could it be that an n-tuple represents anything, 
intrinsically, or otherwise? The n-tuple <Austin, London, pugs> doesn’t represent 
anything, so why think it is any different with, say, <Garth Brooks, the property of being 
Canadian>? As Hanks and others have argued, Millian and Fregean theorists have 
offered no plausible account of how the constituents of such an n-tuple can be “glued” 
together so as to issue in a genuinely representational entity. 
Much of the new work on propositions can be seen as an attempt to explain how 
propositions could be representational even if not intrinsically so. For our own part, we 
don’t think that propositions do, in fact, represent, so our principle worry about the 
traditional Millian and Fregean accounts is different. As also emphasized by Hanks and 
Soames, these traditional accounts of content claim that propositions play a 
fundamental role in the story of mental and linguistic representation. According to the 
Millian and Fregean theorists, our thoughts and utterances ​inherit​ their 
representational features from their propositional contents. For example, Gwen’s belief 
is claimed to represent as it does ​in virtue of ​its content – the proposition that Chris 
Gaines is Canadian. But how exactly could this be? How (even in principle) could the 
(putatively) representational features of a proposition “trickle” its way down to our 
token cognitive states and utterances?​16​ More plausibly, our thoughts and utterances 
represent as they do, not in virtue of their propositional contents, but rather in terms of 
naturalistically specifiable properties they instantiate.  In slogan form: ​propositions 
serve to help us keep track of the representational facts, facts which themselves must 
be understood without essential appeal to propositions.​ Propositions are, as Loar 
(1981) once put it, “external indices” that simply help us categorize and track 
representational facts.  
We think this insight – let’s call it​ the categorization insight​ – should be accepted 
by all theorists  and, moreover, it is the key to resolving the traditional debate between 
the Millian and Fregean regarding grain. As we will argue, it is a short step from viewing 
propositions as devices of categorization to a variety of  pluralism about content. The 
best way to see how this idea might work is to see it in the context of a specific 
categorizing view. Although we think the move we wish to make may be open to other 
categorizing theorists, we will focus on the act-type theory and our own preferred view, 
Minimalism. 
16
 See Grzankowski and Buchanan (2019) for further discussion. 
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According to the act-type theorist, propositions are types of cognitive acts. 
Specifically, they are types whose tokens are specific, representational, predicative 
actions. For example, when one judges that Garth is Canadian, one predicates the 
property of being Canadian of Garth. This token act falls under a type: the act-type of 
predicating being Canadian of Garth. The act-type theory of propositions identifies 
propositions with such act types. So, the proposition that ​a ​is F ​just is​ the act-type of 
predicating F of ​a​. The fundamental relationship that holds between thinkers and the 
contents of their thoughts is simply one of tokening of a type. For example, Soames 
holds that ​what it is ​to entertain that Garth is Canadian is to perform a token act of 
predicating being Canadian of Garth. Other propositional attitudes can then be analyzed 
in terms of entertaining: to judge that Garth is Candian is to predicate being Canadian of 
him ​and to endorse that prediction​; believing that proposition is the disposition to so 
judge.​17​ The basic idea might be spelled out in various ways, but the principle is that 
there are certain events/actions that are themselves representational (token predicative 
acts) and propositions must be understood as devices for categorizing them. The 
relationship between these representational events/acts and the propositions that we 
use to track them is of  token to type.  
Despite the many attractive features of the view, it comes with some serious 
costs. In previous work we have discussed some of these costs and we won’t rehearse all 
the details now, but, in short, we think that the act-type theorists make unnecessary 
commitments that lead to hard questions and serious problems.​18​ We here briefly 
mention just two. 
First, the act-type view leads to the conclusion that propositions are literally 
things that one ​does​. It is very tempting to claim this claim constitutes a category 
mistake – how could the proposition that Garth is Canadian ​happen​ ​yesterday​ or ​be 
done by​ someone? Act-type theorists are, of course, well aware of this problem and are 
apt to claim that they are offering a ​revisionary​ metaphysics. Even so, we are not, 
ourselves ready to bite this bullet since, as will emerge, we think that there is another 
alternative (Minimalism) that has all of the virtues of the act-type theory but without 
this initially troubling consequence. 
17
 See Soames (2010) for further development. 
18
 See Buchanan and Grzankowski (forthcoming) and Grzanowski and Buchanan (2019). 
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Second, we think that commitment to token ​predicative acts​ as basic is 
misplaced. When we think of the various representations that we would like our theory 
of content to help us track, predicative events and activities are just a special case. For 
example, we are sympathetic to the view that our perceptual states are propositional 
attitudes, but we think it  is a stretch to conceive of these states as involving any acts of 
predication performed ​by an agent​.​19​ While ​looking ​and ​listening​ may indeed be things 
one ​does​, ​seeing​ and ​hearing​ are not.​20​ You do not ​perform​ the act of predicating, say, 
redness of the cup when you  see the red cup. Even if one holds that a computational 
system is engaged in building up representations when you perceive the cup, it is 
implausible that this is, in any sense, an ​action​ of yours, any more than, say, your liver 
processing the alcohol you consumed at dinner can be considered something ​you​ did as 
an agent.   Likewise, it is difficult to see how exactly to analyze other of our propositional 
attitudes such as our wants and desires in terms congenial to the act-type theory. When 
Gwen desires that Mom visit, she is not yet, in any sense, predicating visiting of Mom. If 
she had already performed the prediction, what is left to desire?​21​ The act-type theorist 
might claim that in such propositional attitudes a prediction is made and then canceled 
(Hanks 2015) or that there is some variety of non-commital prediction (Soames 2015), 
but neither of these options is especially appealing to us. Again, we would prefer an 
account that captures the insights of the act-type account, but which doesn’t force us to 
address such worries. 
There is indeed a much more minimal (and general) alternative way of capturing 
the categorization insight that underwrites the act-type account. Recall that categorizing 
views of propositions aim to coordinate attitudes in terms of what they represent with 
entities. More specifically, any two mental or linguistic states that represent the same as 
each other must be coordinated with the same proposition; a proposition is simply an 
entity whose job it is to help us keep track of such representational similarities and 
differences. In effect, we claim that this is the only thing you need to know in order to 
fully understand the nature of propositions.  
By our lights, all theorists can, and should, accept the following bi-conditional:  
 
19
 See Hanks (2015, p 211) who aims to finesse this point by distinguishing between those states that are 
constitutively or fundamentally propositional versus those that have content in a non-constitutive or 
non-fundamental sense. We’d prefer a theory that doesn’t force one’s hand and leaves space for the view 
that perception is, fundamentally, a propositional attitude. See also Soames (2015, ch. 5) who looks to be 
committed to the view that perception does involve acts of predication by an agent. 
20
 See Crowther (2009). 
21
 See Schiller (forthcoming). 
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PC: The propositional content of M1 = the propositional content of M2 iff 
M1 and M2 represent exactly the same objects, properties, and relations in 
exactly the same way (where M1 and M2 range over possible mental state 
tokens). 
 
(We call it for ‘PC’ for “propositions on the cheap”.) In Grzankowski and Buchanan 
(2019), it has been argued that no one should find fault in the ​truth ​of this 
bi-conditional. The act-type theorists’ view entails PC and seems to capture a minimal 
constraint on propositional content. But on our view, PC provides an (implicit) real 
definition of propositions in just the way that (a) and (b) plausibly do for numbers and 
directions, respectively:  
 
(D) The direction of line A = the direction of line B iff A and B are parallel. 
 
(N) The number of Fs = the number of Gs iff there is a one-to-one  
correspondence between the Fs and the Gs. 
 
Likewise, we think that PC tells us everything there is to know about ​what it is for a 
thing to be ​a proposition. If there are entities answering to the left hand side of PC (and 
we think there are) “then there is no question of what their natures are, since their 
natures flow from their definitions and their definitions are settled” (Rosen and Yablo, 
manuscript, p.11). Moreover, the right-hand side of PC should be understood as more 
fundamental than the left. Very much in the spirit of other categorizers (and, in fact, 
naturalisers more generally), it is ​because ​token mental states represent the same as 
each other that they have the same content, not vice versa. There are many ways one 
might go on to tell this story (in terms of tracking, teleology, multiple relations, or so on) 
but whatever it is, it is doubtful that such a story must make essential appeal to relations 
to propositional abstracta. In slogan form, the facts about linguistic and mental 
representation come first.​22 
22
 On our preferred view, mental representation is itself explanatorily prior to linguistic representation, so 
in what follows we will focus on the former. 
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It is, however, not enough to simply say what contents are. We must also say 
what it takes to ​have​ content. When one bears a propositional-attitude relation to a 
proposition, one must be in a state of a certain sort that represents in a certain way. 
Furthermore, anyone else who represents that way will also be related to the same 
proposition. By PC, there must be an abstract entity in common to such 
co-representations – the belief that grass is green represents the same way as all the 
other states from which the proposition that grass is green is abstracted. The relation of 
having a content can then be understood as follows: X is in a token mental state which 
represents the same way as all other states from which Y is an abstract. When X stands 
in such a relation to Y, X is in a propositional attitude relation to Y; X has Y as its 
content. 
Minimalism demands very little regarding the nature of propositions. PC only 
requires that the (possible) mental state tokens on the right-hand side represent. More 
generally, Minimalism does not require that propositions must, in any sense, inherit the 
properties of the (possible) mental state tokens from which they are abstracted. Even if, 
for example, the mental states we use propositions to track are structured and 
representational (for example, suppose they are sentences in Mentalese), there is no 
demand that propositions must themselves have (or inherit) these features.​23​ For the 
Minimalist, we should not worry about whether propositions have any features that 
cannot be directly read off from the abstraction principle via which these entities are 
introduced. Hence, questions such as whether propositions could turn out to ​really​ be 
types of actions/events, or whether they must themselves be ​really​ representational, 
simply do not arise for the Minimalist. Propositions have no such hidden natures to 
discover. 
At the core of the recent work on act-type accounts is the categorization 
conception of propositional content. We think that Minimalism fully accommodates this 
important insight, but does so without incurring the further costs and commitments of 
the act-type view. Act-type theorists – and all would-be naturalizers – accept PC, and, 
like us, understand the right-hand side to be more fundamental in the order of 
explanation. Why should we commit to anything more?  
Though we have been emphasizing some of the differences between our favored 
story from that of the act-type theorist, it should be clear that there are deep 
commonalities between the two. In the next section, we will highlight one such 
important commonality: both views naturally lend to content pluralism.  
 
Section Three: Grain and Plurality 
23
 See Grzankowski and Buchanan (2019) as well as Rescorla’s (2020) for more on this point.  
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Let’s take inventory. In section 1 we argued that there is a sense in which Gwen believes 
that Garth is Canadian and a sense in which she does not. Rather than force a choice 
and finess the unpalatable consequences, it is our view that one’s theory should respect 
that data as it is found. In section 2 we turned to the categorization approach to 
propositions and argued that insight underlying this approach has given way to 
important and interesting new accounts of propositions. Our own favored view, 
Minimalism, is one such view and it is built around a principle, PC, that we think all 
theorists should take as a starting point. Understood in this way, we might see the 
act-type theorists as one who accepts PC as true, but denies that it provides the whole 
story regarding propositional content. They then go on to claim that, for example, we 
must further understand the entities referred to on the left-hand side of PC as types of 
predicative acts, and the (possible) mental states on the right-hand side, tokens of those 
acts. For now, however, we just want to emphasize that act-type theorists accept PC even 
if they think more must be said regarding the nature of propositions. 
But what are the implications of accepting PC in tandem with our observations 
regarding the Millian and the Fregean in Section 1?  As best we can see, the implication 
is a kind of pluralism.  
In the present section we will explain this consequence and clarify the general 
shape that we think this pluralism will take. We will argue that  there is a lot to like in 
the kind of pluralism we will offer, but, of special interest, the picture allows us to 
respect the inutions we have about Gwen and about Frege cases more generally. We will 
then close by offering ome reasons for thinking that the act-type theory, with its 
additional commitments that go beyond Minimalism, is committed to a much more 
expansive, and potentially problematic, kind of pluralism. 
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Recall that the right-hand side of PC concerns sameness of representation. On 
the Minimalist view, the central question about grain comes down to how we ought to 
think about sameness and difference of mental representation, as the answer to that 
question will determine the deliverances of PC. As we argued above, we think that in a 
case like Gwen’s, the answer to this question fails to be univocal. This observation – this 
data point – should now  be slotted into PC. There is a sense in which Gwen represents 
things as being the way folks in the know about Gains and Brooks represent things. The 
sense is the one brought out by classical Millians. There is also a sense in which Gwen 
represents differently than those in the know but the same as other confused fans. This 
sense is the one brought out by the classical Fregeans.​24​ PC hence has two 
disambiguations and yields two entities as a result. One entity has a “Millian grain” and 
the other a “Fregean grain”. 
If the notion of ‘representation’ appealed to in PC is indeed equivocal, we are 
given a plurality of contents, since anytime there is a truth on the right-handside of PC, 
there is a corresponding entity named on the left-hand side. There are propositions a 
plenty for both the would-be Fregean and the Millian. But we must treat this result with 
some caution.  More specifically, we should avoid any temptation to think that the 
upshot of this view is that Gwen has a single belief with multiple contents. This is ​not 
how one should utilize the plurality provided by PC. In fact, we think that this ought to 
be avoided. Consider the property of being the belief state (that is, consider the type of 
belief) that Brooks is Canadian. Such a property is a composite property, part of which is 
the relation of believing and part of which is the content of the belief. In what sense 
might such a property have ​multiple​ contents? A belief is the very belief that it is at least 
in part because of how it represents. If one holds that beliefs and other intentional states 
have multiple contents, it becomes difficult to make sense of this truism. Rather, PC 
provides the story concerning propositions (now a plurality of them) but it brings with it 
a theory of the relation that thinkers bear to propositions. The relation, to repeat from 
above, is as follows: X is in a token mental state which represents the same way as all 
other states from which Y is an abstract. When X stands in such a relation to Y, X is in a 
propositional attitude relation to Y. In effect, along with a plurality of contents comes a 
plurality of mental states. 
24
 And in the extreme, there may be a sense – following Field (2016), call it an “egocentric content” – in 
which representing-the-same-as that requires nothing short of sameness of truth-condition as well as 
sameness of conceptual role.  Understood as such, these egocentric contents might (de facto) never be 
shared between two distinct agents (or even the same agent across times).  
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To elaborate, let’s return to Gwen. Given that there is a sense in which Gwen 
represents the same way as the fans in the know, there is a proposition that is in 
common amongst those fans and Gwen. A belief of Gwen’s ​has​ that content, ​i.e.​ that 
content is such that Gwen is in a token mental state that represents the same as the 
other mental states from which that content is an abstract. On our view, Gwen’s token 
belief has only that single content. But given that there is a sense in which it represents 
the same as the many confused fans, there is another content and, corresponding to it, 
another token belief of Gwen’s. Gwen has, what we might call, a Fregean belief as well as 
a Russellian belief.  If so, it really is true, then, that there is a sense in which Gwen does 
believe what those in the know about Garth Brooks believe and a sense in which she 
does believe what those who are confused believe. We tie ourselves into knots over Frege 
cases by assuming there is but one belief. 
But let us be very clear now about the relationship between Gwens beliefs and 
Gwen’s brain, for the proliferation of ​mental​ states might initially seem incredible. Our 
view is ​not​ that there are more brain states than one might have imagined. Let us 
suppose for a moment that physicalism is correct and that there is some interesting 
brain state of Gwen’s that we have isolated. That brain state will have various intrinsic 
properties such as firing and so and so many Hertz, weighting such and such many 
micrograms, and so on. That brain state constitutes, but is not identical to, Gwen’s 
Fregean belief. That very same brain state constitutes, but is not identical to, Gwen’s 
Russellian belief. The difference lies in the various relational properties that the brain 
state instantiates. The Russellian belief is constituted not only by the brain matter but 
also by the relations to worldly objects and properties such as Garth himself. The 
Fregean belief is constituted not only by the brain matter but also by, say, the relations 
to other mental states of Gwen’s (for example, Gwen will deny Gains is a music 
legend).​25​ In short, we hold the independently motivated view of constitution 
physicalism.​26 
25
 The causal properties of beliefs and other mental states are physical properties. Since Gwen’s Freagean 
belief and her Millian belief are constituted by the same physical brain stuff, they both plausibly inherit 
the casual properties of the common neuro-physiological state.  
26
 We discuss this view and argue for it in more detail in Buchanan and Grzankowski (ms). Importantly, 
the constitution view is well motivated in the face of Kripke’s (1980) famous argument concerning pain 
and the nearby variant of that argument applied to representational states found in Burge (2009). Mental 
states cannot be identical to brain states but they can be constituted by them. On our favored view, your 
token mental states are “qua objects” in Fine’s sense (1982, 2003, 2008). For example, your belief that 
grass is green  might be identified with a state of your brain 
qua-thing-with-such-such-history-and-functional-role.  
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The variety of pluralism at which we have arrived raises numerous difficult 
questions that don’t seem altogether easy to resolve. For example, we’ve been 
proceeding as though there are only two possible senses of ‘representing-the-same’ as it 
occurs in PC. Is that right? Might there not be others? For example, are there a 
multitude of more or less, fine-grained sameness relations? Or is there a 
sameness-relation that requires sameness of phenomenology? We can’t settle these 
questions here. Rather, our goal has been to show that a commitment to PC – which we 
think everyone should share – in tandem with our intuitions regarding Millian/Fregean 
cases (taken at face-value) pushes us towards pluralism. Moreover, we think that this 
pluralism seems to be just what is required to make sense of the lack of resolution in the 
debate between Millians and Fregeans. Reconsider Gwen. When we reflect on whether 
she does or does not believe that Garth is Canadian, we can genuinely respect the 
intuitive verdict: in a sense she does, and in a sense she doesn’t. If you accept PC and 
that our judgements regarding co-representationality are indeed equivocal, you should, 
we hope, also, feel the push to pluralism.​27  
It would take considerable work to show how exactly this view regarding the 
metaphysics of propositions might be squared with a story regarding propositional 
attitude​ ascriptions.​ There is, however, a natural fit between our view of propositional 
content and the accounts of attitude ascription by those theorists such as Richard (1998) 
and Goodman and Lederman (2020) who hold that ‘believes’ is itself a context-sensitive 
expression picking out different relations in different contexts. The very rough idea 
would be that there are – independent of the context of attribution – multiple 
belief-relations, but that oftentimes one, rather than the other of those relations might 
be made to be especially salient in context of the report. In many contexts, however, we 
get pulled in both the Fregean and the Millian directions, however, since the context 
fails to determinately single out a unique representing-the-same relation. We hope that 
these brief remarks are taken in the highly speculative sense in which they are intended. 
Suffice it to say for now, there is a lot of hard work that needs to be done on this front. 
 
 
 
27
 As we pointed out earlier, one can see the Act-type theorist as someone who endorses PC, but then goes 
on to make  further commitments – in particular, to propositions being understood as types of predicative 
acts.  Notice that since a token act will ​always​ fall under indefinitely many different types, this further 
commitment might itself immediately be taken to entail pluralism about content. For example, Gwen’s 
particular cognitive act, of say, predicating snoring of Oscar​ thought of as a pug​ will fall under infinitely 
many distinct types (including, for example, the act-type of predicating snoring of Oscar on a sunny day, 
while wearing a raincoat since that was all true of Oscar on the day). We will leave it up to the reader to 
decide whether this proliferate pluralism flowing directly from the type/token distinction is a cost (Båve 
2019)  or a benefit (see Hanks (manuscript)) of the act-type view.  
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Conclusion  
 
Reflecting on the vast literature on Millian versus Fregean accounts of content can be 
dispiriting. Much ink was spilled, but relatively little was ever achieved by way of 
consensus. We think the lack of consensus itself cries out for explanation. In the 
foregoing, we have argued that a diagnosis as to why consensus could not be found – a 
diagnosis that flows from some extremely  minimal commitments regarding the 
metaphysics of propositions and the attitudinal relations we bear to them. Perhaps, like 
the Act-Type theorist, you think there must be more to propositions than Minimalists 
(such as us) have to offer. But, so long as  you accept PC – and, more generally, the 
categorization picture of propositions that it underwrites – you should feel the pull of 
pluralism, a pluralism that offers a way of reconceiving the traditional debates about the 
grain of content. 
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